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(Scientific Police Research Institute, Tokyo) 
Problems 
Speaking of the perception of mechanical causality, the original systematic 
evidence of Michotte ( 5 ) may be noted as concluding that man has an innate 
tendency to perceive mechanical causality. 
As pointed out by Hume's philosophical consideration ( 4 ), certain result 
might have contiguity with a preceding causation in time and space. Yela 
( 8) and Gruber & others ( 1 ), however, indicated that the mechanical impression 
of causality occurrs even when there is a distance or gap between two successive 
moving objects. Piaget & Lambercier ( 7) brought out the fact that children 
have a causal impression only when they perceive contact between two moving 
objects, whether this contact is objective or subjective. Indeed, their genetic 
explanation based on developmental investigation seems to be sufficiently significant 
for identification of the nature of this phenomenon. 
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the apparatus used in the experiment I. 
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It is suggested by all the studies mentioned above that the temporal relation 
between the two events is more important, for the occurrence of the causal 
impression, than the distance relation. It is worth-while, therefore, appraising 
this temporal condition again. We can examine the relationship of temporal 
conditions to the contents of the causal impression found by Michotte( 5 ) or 
the degrees of this impression, and the effects of the inserted experiences 
reported by Gruber & others( 1 ). 
This method of examination is especially applicable to comparisons of causal 
impressions in two different situations, namely, a "rational situation" to which 
our mechanical common sense is relatively accustomed, and an "irrational 
situation" which is novel to our physical knowledges. The latter has never been 
taken into clear account in previous experiments. 
EXPERIMENT I 
Apparatus 
As is shown in Fig. 1, two vertical poles of the same height stood in front of 
subjects. A horizontal bar was set on the vertical poles. An electric magnet, of 
D. C. 12 volt power, was hidden within the top of the pole on the left of subjects. 
A steel plate was attached to that part of the horizontal bar at which it made 
contact with the top of the left pole. Therefore, the bar could keep its horizontal 
position by the power of the magnet independently of the support of the right hand 
pole. Small rollers placed on a rail were attached to the bottom of the right vertical 
pole pulled by a plummet through a relay of a small wheel. However, because a 
D. C. 12 volt magnet was attached to the left side of the right pole-opposite to the 
side pulled by the plummet, the right pole was fixed by the power of this magnet. 
First when a time regulator cut off the magnet which made the right pole fixed, it 
was pulled by the weight of plummet and fell away from the visual field of the 
subjects. Second when the time regulator cut off the magnet which kept the bar hori-
zontally, it fell down. The subjects could observe only the vertical poles and the 
horizontal bar above the poles through a peep-window between the subjects and the 
apparatus. The subjects were 26 undergraduate and postgraduate students. They 
had never experienced any experiment similar to this one. 
Procedures 
The Subjects were divided into three groups, namely, control group (n = 10), 
experimental group I (n = 8), experimental group II(n=8). Test of the perception of 
causality was imposed on these three groups two times. Each group, however, was 
treated differently in the interval between pretest and posttest. The control group 
had ten minutes pause between the two tests. Experimental group I observed the 
delayed relation ten times just after the pretest; this meant observing the events in 
which one second temporal interval existed between the removal of the right pole 
and the fall of the horizontal bar. Experimental group II observed the undelayed 
relation ten times just after the pretest; this meant observing the events in which 
no temporal interval existed. 
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The subjects were asked to report the following. ( 1 ) Whether the fall of the 
horizontal bar appeared to be a consequence of the removal of the right pole or 
not; in other words, whether they got an impression of any causal relationship 
between the two events or not. ( 2) If they got any causal impression in the events, 
was it strong, medium or weak in its absolute impression ? Further, how did the 
removal of the pole relate to the fall of the bar? 
Moreover, the subjects were told that these two successive events had no 
causal relation in fact. 
The experimenter varied the time interval from . 0 second to the value at 
which even the weak causal impression disappeared and vice versa. 
Results 
All the subjects reported that they got some causal impression. It is 
possible to combine the pretest data of the three groups because all groups 
have the same experimental condition at the pretest. Average values of the 
maximum temporal thresholds necessary for the occurrence of the causal 
impression of all the subjects are shown in Table 1 at each impression degree. 
Table 1. Average thresholds obtained with the three groups of the 
subjects in the pretest data (second). 
Impression degrees strong medium weak 
Temporal thresholds 0.253 0.340 0.461 
The next calculation is based upon variations of the maximum temporal 
thresholds in the posttest data(S) from those in the pretest data(So). Each 
ratio(V%) shown in table 2 is got by the following formula. 
S- So V%= So X 100 
Table 2. Variations according to the inserted experiences 
between the two tests (%). 
_____________ pegrees J strong J medium J weak 
Groups -------
Control gr. +5.2 +9.6 +4.0 
Exper. gr. I +37. 2 +19.1 +29. 3 
Exper. gr. II -10.8 -7.6 -19. 4 
According to the subject's introspection, the removal of the right pole 
seemed to give only a help for a potential falling power of the horizontal bar. 
This help was the impression that the pole had attraction for the bar. The 
attraction was not a function that the pole caused, in active manner, the bar 
to move. 
Moreover, one of the subjects said that he had imagined that the bar 
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seemed to be hung by a thin string, when he observed the occurrence of the 
weak causal impression, because there was a little time lag between the two 
events. 
Consideration 
As the variation ratio indicates, observing the delayed relation increases 
the temporal impression threshold of causality. On the other hand, observing 
the undelayed relation decreases the threshold. 
Then, it is noted that most of the subjects report some causal meaning 
between the two events. This meaning is that the first object movement has 
attraction for the second object movement. We might call this phenomenon an 
"attraction effect". 
Emegence of visual imagery in the occurrence of the weak attraction effect 
seems to accord with one of the results obtained by Gruber & others (1). 
EXPERIMENT II 
Apparatus 
A horizontal bar was looked to be placed on two vertical poles, when the 
subjects saw the apparatus shown in Fig. 2. The top of the left hand pole was fixed 
to the horizontal bar. The bar could make a movement. D.C. 12 volt magnet 
was placed under a thin metal plate attached to the left part of the bar to keep it 
horizontal. The bottom of the right hand pole was fixed to a rest. This pole was 
pulled by a strong rubber. The opposite side of it had a thin metal plate which was 
attracted by D.C. 12 volt magnet. The right pole was, thus, vertical, but could 
make a movement. 
First, the time regulator cut off the magnet concerned in fixation of the right 
pole, it fell down. Second, when the time regulator cut off the magnet concerned 
in fixation of the horizontal bar, it Jell down. 
The subjects were 21 undergraduate and postgraduate students who had 
participated in the experiment I. 
Procedures 
The procedures were almost identical with those in the experiment I except the 
number of subjects, namely, control group=7, experimental group I= 7, experimental 
group II= 7. 
Fig. 2. Diagram of the apparatus used in the experiment II. 
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The subjects were asked to report whether it appeared to them that the 
horizontal bar fell down as a consequence of the collapse of the right pole or not. 
The other instructions were just similar to those in the experiment I. 
Results 
All the subjects reported that they got a certain causal impression. Average 
values of the maximum temporal thresholds, necessary for the occurrence of 
the causal impression in the pretest data, are shown in Table 3 at each impression 
degree. 
Table 3. Average thresholds obtained with the three groups of the 
subjects in the pretest data (second). 
Impression degrees strong medium weak 
Temporal thresholds 0. 108 0. 173 0.263 
Table 4 shows variations of the maximum temporal thresholds m the 
posttest data from those in the pretest data. Each ratio is got by the same 
formula as mentioned in the experiment I. 
Table 4. Variations according to the inserted experiences between 
the two tests (%). 
~--=:::_:__begrees I 
Groups ~- strong I medium I weak 
Control gr. ~ +3.1 +3.9 Exper. gr. I +60.4 +61. 0 Exper. gr. II -21. 3 -24.1 
According to the subject's introspection, the fall of the right pole was like 
an attraction for the horizontal bar. No visual imagery was used when the 
impression occurred. 
Consideration 
The maximum temporal threshold of the causal impression m this experi-
ment is smaller, at each impression degree, than the threshold m the experi-
ment I. 
However, observing the delayed relation makes increase of the temporal 
threshold of the causal impression, but observing the undelayed relation makes 
decrease of the threshold. 
Moreover, the impression reported is the "attraction effect" in quality. 
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EXPERIMENT III 
Apparatus 
In appearance, the apparatus shown in Fig. 3 was almost identical with that in the 
experiment IL But two objects made an irrational event situation in movements. 
The left edge of the horizontal bar had a string with a weight. This weight 
was supported to hold the bar horizbntally by a metal plate which a D. C. 12 
volt magnet attracted. 
First when the time regulator cut off the magnet for the right pole, it fell 
down. Second, when the time regulator cut off the magnet for the horizontal bar, 
it jumped up. 
The subjects were 21 students. They had experienced the experiment I and 
experiment IL 
• 
Fig. 3. Diagram of the apparatus used in the experiment I[. 
Procedures 
The procedures were not different from those in the experiment II on the whole 
except a few detail. The subjects were asked to report the following; ( 1) Whether 
the collapse of the pole caused the bar to jump up or not. ( 2) If any causality was 
seen in the events, was it strong, medium or weak in its absolute impression? 
Further, how did the pole relate to the bar ? 
Results 
In this situation again, all the subjects reported some causal impression. 
Average values of the maximum temporal thresholds, necessary for the occurrence 
of the causal impression in the pretest data, are shown in Table 5 at each 
impression degree. 
Table 5. Average thresholds obtained with the three groups of the 
subjects in the pretest data (second). 
Impression degrees strong medium weak 
Temporal thresholds 0.083 0. 149 0. 235 
Table 6 shows variations of the maximum temporal thresholds m the 
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posttest data. 
Table 6. Variations according to the inserted experiences between 
the two test (%). 
~\ strong \ medium \ weak 
Control gr. -2.1 +9.5 +2.7 
Exper. gr. I +2.4 +3.0 +7.4 
Exper. gr. II +28.6 +28. 3 +0.9 
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The subjects reported that the pole flipped up the bar when the strong 
impression was got. The first movement propelled the second movement. On 
the other hand, the pole gave its moving power to the bar when the medium 
and weak impressions were got. The first movement passed its moving power to 
the second movement. 
Consideration 
It is noticed that the impression of causality between the two events is 
obtained even in the irrational situation, which is novel to our physical common 
sense. 
It is remarkable that a "propelling effect" of the first movement on the 
second is reported only with the strong causal impression only in this irrational 
situation. This effect seems to correspond to "effet lancement" found by Michotte 
(5). A "passing effect" of the first movement on the second is obtained with 
the medium and weak impressions. This effect seems to correspond to "effet 
entrainement" of Michotte (5). 
Then, we must pay attention to a nuance of the passing effect and the 
attraction effect reported in the rational situations. The passing effect is more 
active, in way of relation of the first object to the second, than the attraction 
effect. The latter is perceived rather naturally because of rationality of the 
situations. A qualitative similarity, however, seems to exist between these two 
effects. This similarity is a help of the first movement for the second. Therefore, 
both effects might be inclusively called an "induction effect". 
Lastly, as the variation ratio indicates, the inserted observation, whether 
it is observing the delayed relation or observing the undelayed relation, makes 
increase of the temporal threshold of causality both in experimental group I 
and in experimental group IL 
General Consideration and Discussion 
Is the first occurrence of the causal impression based on a deduction from 
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previous experiences especialy in the perception of mechanical causality ? 
Otherwise, does the occurrence of the impression of mechanical causality depend 
on an innate factor in rudiment ? 
The results of our experiments seem to support the latter opinion ; that is 
to say, (1) The causal relation is perceived as a function of time in the irrational 
situation as well as in the rational situations. This means that the degrees of 
the causal impression get weak with increase of the temporal interval between 
the two events. In particular, the interval, maximum for the occurrence of the 
strong causal impression, ranges from 0.083 to 0.253 second in the three experi-
ments. What does this fact mean ? 
According to our experiment on the Tau effect, the pause time between 
two successive light stimuli, which is optimum for the occurrence of the visual 
Tau effect, is 0.150 second. When this pause time is from 0.050 to 0.300 second, 
phenomenal reduction of the distance between the two lights, which is from 
10% to 6%, is outstanding, including 17.9% (reduction) when the pause time 
is 0.150 second. It seems to us that the range of the maximum temporal threshold 
of the strong causal impression corresponds to the range of the pause time for 
the outstanding occurrence of the Tau effect. 
(2) In the subject's introspections, the propelling effect occurrs only in the 
irrational situation and contains the stronger causal impression than the in-
duction effect. Speaking of the induction effect, the passing effect, which is 
more active than the attraction effect, is accompanied with the medium and 
weak impressions only in the irrational situation. The attraction effect gets 
strong, medium and weak impressions of causality only in the rational situations. 
To sum up, we could say that irrationality of an event situation produces 
more active and stronger impressions of causal relation. 
(3) Observing the delayed relation slows down the occurrence of the causal 
impression, and observing the undelayed relation facilitates it. This tendency is 
outstanding in the rational situations. Gruber & others (1) suggest that this 
phenomenon may be the anchor effect. Indeed, this seems to be the anchoring 
effect, which is determined by the central nervous process as well as the peripheral 
process in judgements in general, pointed out by Hunt and Volkmann (2, 3). 
At any rate, the inserted experiences of observing the relations play no 
role to promote the same kind of observation afterwards. 
(4) An instruction that there is no causal relation between the two events 
has effect on the perception of causality, because all the subjects obtain some 
causal impression. 
(5) However, it is noted that a subject reports that he saw visual imagery 
as a help for the occurrence of the weakest causal impression in the rational 
situation. This may mean that a certain experience of our every day life con-
pensates psycho-physical conditions, inconvenient for the occurrence of the 
causal impression, especially in a situation related with our experience. 
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In conclusion, the impression of mechanical causality is primarily a per-
ceptual affair which immediately comes from stimulus conditions without 
empirical factors, and secondly is mediated by imagery from experience. 
(P. S.) This paper is a part of the experiments brough out at Psychology Laboratory, 
Faculty of Letters, Tohoku University from 1958 to 1959. Most of this is the 
translation from the paper "Ingakankei no chikaku ni kansuru kenkyu (An investi-
gation on the perception of causal relations)" published in Jikken Shinrigaku (The 
Tohoku Journal of Experimental Psychology 1959. But this includes some rearrange-
ments based on recent consideration. 
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Summary 
The occurrence of the perception of mechanical causality was compared in two 
kinds of situation ; rational situation and irrational situation. In the rational 
situations, a horizonatl bar above two vertical poles fell down, ( i) when one of 
poles was removed, and (ii) when a pole fell down. In the irrational situation, a 
bar jumped up following a fall of a supporting pole. The results were as follows. 
(1) The causal impression was got as a function of time in the irrational 
situation as well as in the rational situations. In particular, the range of the 
temporal threshold for the occurrence of the strong causal impression corresponds to 
the range of the pause time for the outstanding occurrncc of the Tau effect. (2) The 
subjects reported two effects; the propelling effect and the induction effects. The 
latter can be divided into two categories; the passing effect and the attraction 
effect. In the systematic occurrence of these effects, we find out the fact that 
irrationality of a situation produces the more active impression of causality. (3) A 
preceding observation of the delayed relation slowed down the occurrence of the 
causal impression, and observing the undelayed relation facilitated it. (4) An 
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instruction that there is no causal relation between the two events had no effect on 
the perception of causality. (5) But, visual imagery was used as a help for the occur-
rence of the weakest impression in the rational situation. 
In conclusion, the impression of causality is primarily a perceptual affair which 
immediately cornes from stimulus conditions without empirical factors, and secondly 
is mediated by imagery. 
Résumé 
On a comparé dans deux sortes des situations la façon dont se produit la 
perception de la causalité méchanique: dans des situations rationnelles et dans une 
situation irrationelle. Dans les situations rationnelles, une barre horizontale posée 
sur deux poteaux verticaux tombait ( i) quand on enlevait un des poteaux, et (ii) 
quand un poteau tombait. Dans la situation irrationnelle, la barre s'élevait vers le 
haut quand le poteau de soutien tombait. Les résultats étaient les suivants: 
(1) L'impression causale était reçue en fonction de temps aussi bien dans la 
situation irrationnelle que dans les situation rationnelles. En particulier, l'étendue 
de seuil temporel nécessaire pour que se produise la forte impression causale 
correspondait à l'étendue de temps de pause nécessaire pour que l'effet de Tau se 
produise de façon aigüe. (2) Les sujets signalèrent deux effets: un effet moteur et 
effet d'induction. Le second peut se diviser en deux catégories: l'effet passager et 
l'effet d'attraction. Nous trouvons dans l'apparition systematique de ces effects le 
fait que c'est l'irrationnalité de la situation qui produit l'impression de causalité la 
plus vive. (3) L'apparition de l'impression causale était ralentie lorsqu'on observait 
auparavant la relation retardée, et facilitée lorsqu'on observait la relation immédiate. 
(4) La perception de la causalité n'était pas affectée lorsqu'on faisait savoir au sujet 
qu'il n'y avait pas de relation causale entre les deux événements. (5) Mais l'usage 
d'images visuelles favorisait l'apparition de l'impression la plus faible dans la situation 
rationnelle. 
Pour conclure, l'impression de causalité est en premier lieu une affaire de 
perception qui est en relation immédiate avec des stimulus, sans facteurs empiriques; 
elle est en deuxième lieu déterminée par des images. 
